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ABSTRACT
This study examined decisions made by householders under wildfire threat. Data were
obtained from interviews with survivors of severe wildfires in Victoria (Australia) on 7
February 2009 which killed 172 civilians and destroyed more than 2,000 homes. Prior to this,
Australian fire agency community wildfire safety policy was that residents should: ‘Prepare,
stay and defend or leave early’. Most of the 223 interviewees who stayed and defended did so
because this was their wildfire safety plan, and they believed that they would be successful
despite the predicted extreme fire danger weather. In 79% of cases, defence was successful;
for the remaining 21% the house was destroyed and several lives were imperilled. Of the 216
who left for a safer location only 39% said that this was their wildfire safety plan; for most,
the action of leaving was triggered by realisation of the imminent threat posed by the fire;
36% self-evacuated under hazardous conditions. The findings suggest that community
wildfire safety programs should emphasize: (a) the risks associated with staying to defend a
property; and (b) how householders should prepare in order to leave safely if a fire threatens.
Keywords:
community wildfire safety
property defence
evacuation
risk perception
decision making
wildfire survival
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1. Introduction
Because of its climate, vegetation types, and land use and human settlement patterns,
the south-eastern Australian State of Victoria has a long history of disastrous bushfires
associated with periods of drought and days of extreme fire danger weather—high maximum
temperatures, low relative humidities, and strong winds. Over the period 1900-2008 there
were 296 recorded civilian deaths caused by bushfires [1]. In this paper we use the term
‘bushfire’ when discussing the Australian context, and the synonym ‘wildfire’ when
discussing trans-national safety issues.
Following investigations into multi-fatality bushfires in Victoria, South Australia and
Tasmania 1967-1983, Australasian fire agencies concluded that (a) civilians were most likely
to die because of either the effects of radiant heat or as a result of a motor vehicle accident
while fleeing at the last moment, and (b) suitably prepared homes could be defended against
bushfires while providing a safe refuge for people during the passage of the main fire front
[2]. These conclusions informed the Australasian Fire Authorities Council’s (AFAC) 2005
community safety position that able-bodied people should be encouraged to remain on their
property so as to defend their home when threatened by a bushfire: “...By extinguishing small
initial ignitions, people of adequate mental, emotional, and physical fitness, equipped with
appropriate skills, and basic resources, can save a building that would otherwise be lost in a
fire...People should decide well in advance of a bushfire whether they will stay to defend
them or leave if a bushfire threatens” [3, p. 6]. This position came to be summarised as
‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ [4] and was adopted as community bushfire safety
policy by Australasian fire agencies. Such a policy differs from that adopted in most North
American fire jurisdictions where evacuation of residents threatened by a wildfire is the
preferred community safety strategy [5]. However, following the 2009 Victorian bushfires
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(described below) Victoria Police reports that 113 people had perished in their homes [6]
resulted in the policy coming under intense critical scrutiny [7].
Recent trends suggest that wildfires will increasingly pose threats to communities in
Australia and other countries (notably the United States, Canada, Spain, and Greece) largely
because of (a) climate change, (b) fuel and land management practices, and (c) increasing
numbers of dwellings in or adjacent to wildland areas [8]. Improving community wildfire
safety thus seems likely to challenge the capabilities of fire and land management agencies in
these and other countries in the foreseeable future. More frequent serious wildfires and more
households in at-risk locations requires fire agency personnel to better understand residents’
safety-related decisions about staying and defending homes or evacuating, and factors likely
to determine the outcomes of such decisions.
In the remainder of this paper we first note the limited research published so far about
householders’ decisions and actions during wildfires. We describe the disastrous bushfires
which affected many communities in Victoria on 7 February 2009. We present findings from
post-fire field interviews with a sample of survivors and relate these to householders’
decisions to either stay and defend their homes or leave, and we discuss possible implications
of these findings for community wildfire safety policy and practice.
1.1 Community wildfire safety research
Considerable research investigating aspects of community wildfire safety has been
reported. Arguably, the largest thread of wildfire social science research has focussed on
reducing vulnerability of dwellings to wildfire attack and has employed householder surveys
inquiring about their wildfire mitigation intentions and actions (such as vegetation clearing
and using fire-resistant building materials). The findings, overall, suggest that major
determinants of householders’ willingness to undertake mitigation activities include:
(a) perception of bushfire risk; (b) knowledge of mitigation options; (c) acceptance of some
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responsibility for property protection; (d) expectations that mitigation actions will be
effective; and (e) beliefs that the costs of mitigation activities are acceptable in relation to
other household priorities [9 - 14]. Other research findings suggest the likely importance of
factors such as householder gender [15]; residents’ attachment to place [16, 17]; and informal
social community interaction networks [18].
Relatively few investigations of experiences of householders affected directly by
significant wildfires and what they did in response to warnings or threats, and why, have been
reported. Only four such studies were located in the literature2. In surveys of three US
communities affected by wildfires McCaffrey and Winter [19] found that many of the 551
residents surveyed who had been threatened by a wildfire chose to wait and see what
developed before making a final decision about whether the perceived risk warranted
evacuation. Cohn et al. [20] interviewed a total of 183 residents of three US communities
about their wildfire evacuation experiences and identified several factors which made
evacuation problematic for some residents, such as uncertainty about their actual level of risk
and expected lack of facilities for evacuees. Proudley [21] interviewed 38 couples affected by
a nine-fatality bushfire in South Australia and concluded that a policy of ‘prepare, stay and
defend or leave early’ failed to take into account the complexities of choices facing
families—especially mothers’ concerns for the safety of their children—under imminent
bushfire threat. Tibbits and Whittaker [22] analysed nine focus group discussions (73
participants) about experiences during bushfires in north-eastern Victoria in 2003, and
particularly householders’ understanding and actions concerning the ‘prepare, stay and
defend or leave early’ policy. They concluded that while most residents had a good
understanding of what was involved in preparing a property and defending it against a
bushfire, few had a sound understanding of what was involved in leaving safely (that is, selfevacuating) before a bushfire presented a threat to life.
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Taken together, the four studies suggest that the decisions householders make and the
actions they take when warned of a possible wildfire threat involve several interrelated
factors, such as (a) perceived risk; (b) perceived options and potential costs and benefits of
acting on each; (c) household resources and vulnerabilities; and (d) prior plans and
preparations. What seems to be lacking from the current literature is data from householders
whose properties have been seriously threatened, or impacted, by wildfire. In particular,
detailed accounts of householders’ survival-related decisions and actions, including major
determinants, are needed. The present study aims to contribute to remedying this knowledge
gap.
1.2 The 7 February 2009 Victorian bushfires.
On 7 February 2009 the State of Victoria experienced Australia’s worst single day of
bushfires in recorded history. Extreme fire danger weather was predicted by the Bureau of
Meteorology six days in advance. Warnings of extreme fire risk expected on the day were
broadcast frequently, and reported extensively in daily newspapers during the preceding
week, as noted by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission of inquiry [7].
From mid-morning, numerous fires broke out across much of Victoria. As predicted,
the weather conditions were extreme, with high temperatures (>44 degrees Celsius), low
relative humidities (<10%), and strong winds (>100kph) across most of the State. The rainfall
for the previous 12 months was well below the annual average, and this followed a decade of
drought conditions. There were 173 bushfire-related fatalities in total1; more than 2,000
homes were destroyed; and several communities were devastated; resulting in severe
economic, social, and environmental costs, amounting to at least US$4 billion [7].
In the aftermath of the fires a Royal Commission of inquiry was established, which
delivered its Final Report on 31 July, 2010 [7]. Fire agencies were criticised for failures to
provide timely warnings to communities under imminent threats. Evidence presented to the
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Royal Commission suggested that there may have been fewer fatalities and injuries if people
had made (and acted upon) decisions more appropriate to their situation in relation to the
extreme weather conditions, especially decisions to leave—self-evacuate--early. Table 1 [23]
summarizes the circumstances of the 172 civilian deaths attributed directly to events on the
day of the fires.
________________________
Insert Table 1 about here
________________________
The high percentage of fatalities in or near destroyed homes contributed to subsequent
modification of the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ community bushfire safety
policy [3] so that the dangers of staying and defending during extreme fire danger weather
conditions were emphasised and leaving early was promoted as being the safer option [24]:
the new policy was encapsulated as “Prepare. Act. Survive.” [ 25 ].
2. Data Collection and Analysis
Immediately following the 7 February 2009 bushfires senior Bushfire Cooperative
Research Centre3 staff organised a multi-agency research task force to investigate aspects of
the fires and report to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. A major component
of the work of the task force was to interview a cross-section of householders in areas
affected by eight particularly destructive fire complexes4.
2.1. Householders interviewed
Interviews were conducted with 496 residents, from different households, whose
properties were impacted or threatened by the worst bushfires. There were 320 men (65%)
and 173 women (35%), while the gender of three interviewees was not recorded and not
evident from the interview transcripts. Interviewees’ mean age was 49.8 years (SD = 11.6
years).
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Thirty-nine of those interviewed were not at home on the day of the fires by chance
rather than by decisions about bushfire safety--they were absent for a range of work,
recreational, and family related reasons. Ten others relocated to a presumed safer location the
day before the fires. Of the 447 householders at their residences on the day of the fires, 223
stayed and defended their homes, 216 left, and 8 sheltered in place passively.
2.2. Interview procedures
The following is a summary, a detailed account is in McLennan et al. [26]. Interviews
were semi-structured, a copy of the interview guide is in the Appendix. Most interviews were
conducted by 11 staff or research students associated with Royal Melbourne Institute of
Technology (RMIT) University or La Trobe University. Other interviewers were community
safety staff from several state fire agencies. Most interviews lasted between 20 and 40
minutes. Interviews were recorded digitally, and transcribed and checked by professional
transcription services.
2.3 Interview transcript analyses
A content-coding and rating scheme was constructed, following the interview topic
guide, to extract relevant information from the interviews in order to establish trends and
identify associations among reported plans, actions, outcomes and experiences. The coding
categories used are summarised in Table 2.
------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
------------------------------Each transcript was coded independently by two coders; reliability indices are reported in the
Results section. Disagreements were resolved by joint reviews of the transcripts in question,
discussion and consensus.
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The overall analysis procedure involved four steps: (i) coding householder statements
in each transcript by two coders independently, and agreement; (ii) copying the coded
transcript elements into corresponding coding and rating categories in an nVivo8 textmanagement software file; (iii) entering coding and rating values into an SPSS data file and
quantitative analyses; (iv) examining participants’ statements in the nVivo8 coding categories
for themes [27] to assist in the interpretation of the quantitative findings.
3. Results
Findings are presented under three sub-headings: 3.1 Plans, actions, outcomes, safety
issues; 3.2 Preparations for a bushfire: those who stayed and defended, and those who left;
3.3 Deciding to stay and defend or to leave when there is a bushfire threat.
3.1 Plans, actions, outcomes, safety issues
As indicated previously, of the 496 householders interviewed 39 were not at their
residences on the day of the fires by chance (17, 44%, of these homes were destroyed). Their
data have been omitted from subsequent analyses. Table 3 shows bushfire survival plans or
intentions of the remaining 457 householders who made bushfire survival-related decisions.
------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------------Only 10 (2%) householders acted upon fire danger weather warnings from authorities by
leaving on the previous day. Of the 229 householders who intended to stay and defend their
home, 80% did so (another sheltered passively because of the perceived intensity of the fire);
while 20% changed their minds because of the perceived threat posed by the fire (another left
the previous day because of the predicted severe fire danger weather conditions). Of the 103
householders who intended to leave safely, 65% did so; 24% left under hazardous conditions;
while 11% attempted to defend or sheltered passively because they decided that it was not
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safe to leave. Of the 125 householders who intended to wait and see what developed, or had
no plan, or described an unclear plan, 70% left; while 27% attempted to defend their home
(and 3% sheltered passively) because they judged that it was too dangerous to leave.
For the 216 householders who left, 44% of their homes were destroyed; for the 223
householders who stayed and defended, 20% of their homes were destroyed: for this sample
of householders defended homes were less likely to be lost compared with undefended
homes: χ2 (n = 439; df = 1) = 27.50, p < .001, V = .26. This is consistent with previous
findings that defended homes are more likely to survive a bushfire than undefended
homes [28, 29]. For the 181 householders who both planned to stay and defend and did so,
21% of their homes were destroyed. This last finding that prior planning to stay and defend
did not increase the likelihood of successful home defence was unexpected, possible
explanations are discussed in Section 3.2.
Table 4 summarizes the major potential safety-compromising issues described by the
439 householders who stayed and defended or left on the day (responses from those who left
the previous day or who sheltered passively were omitted).
____________________
Insert Table 4 about here
____________________
Safety compromising issues were defined as any events or circumstances which householders
described as having threatened successful implementation of their bushfire survival
intentions. Lack of time to prepare to respond to the direct fire threat (because of inadequate
warning information) was reported to be a potential, and for some an actual, safetycompromising factor by a little more than one-third of those stayed and defended; and by a
little less than one-third of those who left. Feelings of panic, fear, or anxiety; the fire intensity
being much greater than expected; and feeling responsible for the safety of dependent family
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members were reported to be issues by appreciable numbers of both those who stayed and
defended and those who left.
Many of those who stayed and defended described how (a) failure of household
firefighting equipment—mostly water pumps and plastic pipes, fittings and water tanks; (b) a
pre-existing lack of stored water because of the drought; and (c) fatigue or injury to
themselves or family members during the event had potentially compromised their survival.
Many of those who left described lack of official information and warnings about specific
locations under threat, and roads obstructed by fallen trees or downed power lines as
potentially compromising their safety.
Sixty-six householders interviewed described having a backup, or fall-back, plan if
their initial plan could not be implemented, or failed: originally, 52 had planned to stay and
defend, 8 had planned to leave, 6 had an unclear plan or intended to wait and see what
developed. In almost all cases the backup plan was to take last-resort shelter near to the
house—in a vehicle on a cleared area, in a home swimming pool or farm dam, or in an outbuilding or improvised fire shelter such as a cellar. Few of these fall-back plans appeared to
have been developed in detail or prepared for. However, 14 of these 66 householders
survived by implementing their last-resort shelter backup plan.
3.2 Preparations for a wildfire: those who stayed and defended and those who left
Table 5 compares those who stayed and defended with those who left on ratings of
five indicators of bushfire readiness. The 4-level rating scales are described in Table 2. Chisquare analyses showed that householders who stayed and defended their properties
described significantly higher levels of long-term preparation to survive a bushfire; greater
knowledge of bushfires; and higher levels of preparation to survive if a bushfire was to occur
on the day in question. Those who stayed and defended also received somewhat higher
overall ratings of awareness of fire danger weather, awareness of an approaching bushfire,
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psychological readiness to act when threatened. While intriguing, the differences were not
sufficient to reach the criterion for statistical significance.
____________________
Insert Table 5 about here
____________________
A higher percentage of men (57%) than women (36%) stayed and defended. However, Chisquare analyses showed that there were no gender X readiness indicator interactions—that is,
within the categories of those who stayed and defended, and those who left, men and women
did not differ significantly in their rating patterns and only combined results are shown.
Supplementary analyses showed that there were no significant differences between
those who defended their homes successfully and those whose homes were destroyed on:
(a) overall ratings of long-term preparation; (b) knowledge of bushfire; or (c) preparation on
the day. Taken with the finding noted in Section 3.1 that having planned to stay and defend
did not increase the probability of defending successfully, these results suggest that
householder success or failure in property defence on the day was determined to some extent
by external factors such as the extreme weather conditions, fuel load and proximity, ground
slope, and building construction vulnerability--as well as by chance (Table 4).
3.3 Deciding to stay and defend or to leave when there is a wildfire threat
While householders were not specifically asked, a somewhat higher percentage of
householders who stayed and defended volunteered mention of an emotional attachment to
their home and surrounding environment (43%) compared with those who left (27%):
χ2 (n = 439; df = 1) = 11.21, p < .001, V = .16. Also, a somewhat higher percentage of those
who stayed and defended mentioned links to neighbours and other local residents (58%)
compared with those who left (40%): χ2 (n = 439; df = 1) = 13.57, p < .001, V = .18.
Together, these suggest that for some staying and defending was associated with a feeling of
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attachment to home and community. This finding is consistent with that reported by Paveglio
et al. [30]. Of those who stayed and defended, 35 (16%) mentioned that they had expected to
receive a specific warning from authorities that their property would be threatened by the
fires while 33 (15%) said that they had not expected such a warning. Of those who left, 53
(25%) mentioned that they had expected a specific warning from authorities, while 8 (4%)
said that they had not expected such a warning. These differences suggest that those who
stayed and defended were more likely to believe that they were responsible for their own
safety under bushfire threat: χ2 (n = 129; df = 1) = 17.00, p < .001, V = .38.
Table 6 lists 12 potential determinants of decisions to either stay and defend or to
leave which were mentioned by householders as decision influences. Those who stayed and
defended were more likely to report self-efficacy; prior commitment to their plan; and
outcome efficacy as decision influences. Those who left were more likely to report an
environmental trigger (smoke, flames, embers); family safety concerns; perceived threat from
the fire; and warnings of danger from neighbours and family as decision influences. Other
decision influences mentioned by householders included: information about the fires
broadcast by local radio services; lack of time in which to respond to the fire threat (due
mostly to lack of warnings); and the need to protect animals—both household pets and
livestock. However, differences between those who stayed and defended and those who left
in the frequency of these reported influences were small and not significant.
____________________
Insert Table 6 about here
____________________

14

4. Discussion
4.1 Limitations of the study
Before discussing implications of the findings, potential limitations of the research are
acknowledged. Interviews were conducted on properties where residents were present on
days when task force teams were in the area. Because of the level of destruction and
community dislocation it was not possible to recruit a random representative sample of
householders in the fire-affected locations studied. While those interviewed covered a range
of locations, dwelling types, household compositions, and outcomes, householders whose
homes were destroyed are probably under-represented among the interviewees because they
were no longer able to reside in the local area.
Most survivors would have been exposed to subsequent media reporting on the fires,
which may have influenced aspects of their interviews. Hindsight bias, in which knowledge
of event outcomes influences judgements of the predictability of the outcomes [31], may thus
have had some effects on householders’ reports of events. However, there seem no grounds to
suppose that these effects would differ markedly overall for those who stayed and defended
compared those who left. Issues of hindsight bias and survivors’ recollections are discussed
in more detail by McLennan et al. [32].
4.2 Preparations, warnings and information
The findings from this sample of bushfire-affected householders suggest that fire
agencies had been only moderately successful in their prior information- and education-based
endeavours to prepare Victorian communities for bushfires. Only about half of those
interviewed indicated a high level of awareness of the risks implied by the predicted fire
danger weather. Of those who stayed and defended their property, a little less than half had
undertaken a high level of preparation for defence. Of those who left when threatened, less
than half had undertaken significant planning and preparation for such an eventuality. It
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appears that many residents in bushfire prone areas prior to February 2009 did not perceive
community bushfire safety messages as being relevant to their situation.
It seems that both fire agency community safety personnel and residents of at-risk
communities had poor appreciations of the likely intensities of bushfires burning under the
weather conditions on the day [7]. The significant percentage (20%) of defended homes
destroyed, together with the finding that house-defence success was unrelated to level of
property preparation, suggests that the messages received by householders about the ‘prepare
stay and defend’ component of agencies’ bushfire community safety policy [2-4] did not take
sufficient account of increased vulnerabilities under such extreme bushfire conditions--of
houses, domestic firefighting equipment, and householders.
The reports by many of those who left at the last moment under imminent threat
suggest that the ‘...or leave early’ component of agencies’ bushfire community safety policy
[2-4] was poorly understood—consistent with the findings reported previously by Tibbits and
Whittaker [22] following the 2003 bushfires in north-east Victoria.
The accounts given, both by those who stayed and defended and those who left under
threat, indicated perceived failings in systems and procedures for warning and informing
residents under bushfire threat during extreme weather conditions. Evidence presented
subsequently to the Bushfires Royal Commission [7] supported the reports of many of those
interviewed that their safety was jeopardised by a lack of timely and accurate information
about the location and speed and direction of travel of bushfires threatening communities.
This issue seems likely to remain a challenge for fire agencies. Message texting and social
media did not play a significant role during the 2009 Victorian bushfires. It remains to be
seen if these emerging communication modalities can be harnessed to enhance the
effectiveness of wildfire threat warnings in the future, notwithstanding optimistic claims by
some [33, 34].
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4.3 Deciding to either stay and defend or to leave
Inevitably, the data-reduction procedures which enabled quantitative analyses to
identify trends and associations among issues reported by those interviewed blur the varied
and complex reasons which determined any given individual householder’s decision to stay
and defend or to leave in the face of bushfire threat. Transcripts often described quite
complex householder circumstances where competing threats and priorities had to be
managed—for example, safety of family members versus severe financial losses—and such
individual experiences were lost. However, broad themes are apparent. The data suggest that
for many who stayed and defended, their reasons included an emotional attachment to their
home and neighbours and a belief that they were, at least to some extent, responsible for
protecting their property against bushfire rather than relying wholly on authorities. Acquired
knowledge of bushfire risk generated a plan to prepare, stay and defend in expectation of
success. While commitment to their plan to stay and defend was the principal decision driver
for most, some abandoned this plan when they judged that the threat posed by the
approaching fire was greater than anticipated. A sub-set of those who stayed and defended
did so because they judged that there was no time to leave safely and that attempting to
defend the house was a safer option than fleeing.
It is more difficult to specify the decision-drivers of those who left. For most, it seems
that the major distal factor was absence of a plan to prepare stay and defend. However, there
appeared to be considerable variation among householders in what drove decisions to not
plan to stay and defend. Some did not perceive their home to be at risk of bushfire attack.
Others judged the likely danger to family members as too great to warrant defence. However,
only a small number perceived the danger associated with a potential bushfire to be so high as
to warrant detailed planning and preparation to minimise the risk. For all, a trigger event was
the proximal decision factor. For a very few, this trigger was the fire danger weather
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predictions. For most, the trigger event was a warning (either official or unofficial) of the
danger posed: as credible information about the proximity or intensity of the fire; and/or as
sensory cues from the environment—smoke, embers, flames.
A small, but significant, percentage of householders planned to wait and see how the
situation developed before committing to either staying and defending or leaving. While fire
agencies warn against taking such an approach to warnings of a possible bushfire threat [25]
the limited available evidence [19, 20, 22, 35] indicates that a significant percentage of
residents will do so in the face of a wildfire threat warning. Clearly, further research is
needed so authorities better understand the reasons behind householders’ planning to wait and
see what develops when advised of a wildfire threat, and the implications such thinking has
for community wildfire safety endeavours.
5. Conclusions
1. The limitations inherent in a post-disaster field research study such as this one mean that
findings should be regarded as suggestive. In particular, the interview sample was largely one
of convenience and generalisations of findings about householder preparedness to other
communities are questionable. However, two subsequent post-bushfire research studies in
Western Australia, Lake Clifton (January 2011) and Perth Hills (February 2011) found
similarly low levels of householder preparedness for bushfire [36, 37]. Additional postwildfire investigations of householders’ decisions and actions are needed to further confirm
and extend the present findings and to evaluate the effectiveness of fire agencies’ current and
future community wildfire policies, priorities, and programs.
2. Unless there are appreciable changes in Australian community attitudes generally toward
bushfire risk, it seems likely that few householders will leave their home and self-evacuate to
a safer location based solely on fire danger weather prediction-based warnings. For most
residents who do not plan to defend their home, a decision to leave will be made only when a
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trigger event, such as a credible warning message (official or unofficial) or environmental
cues (such as smoke, embers, flames), indicates an actual bushfire threat.
3. A distinction needs to be made, by at-risk householders and fire agency staff alike,
between the risks faced by householders under typical wildfire threat conditions and dangers
entailed by wildfires burning under extreme fire danger weather conditions such as those
which occurred in Victoria on 7 February 2009. This is especially relevant to property
defence, where preparations which may well be adequate under typical wildfire weather
conditions are likely to prove inadequate under extreme conditions. Educational material
about property defence against wildfires should emphasize the risks involved and the need for
a sound back-up plan in case defence fails. Specifying adequacy of property preparedness for
defence in relation to different weather conditions is a formidable challenge for wildfire
safety agencies.
4. The difficulties that many residents reported in knowing when to leave safely suggests that
Australasian fire agencies may need to provide more detailed and specific information to
householders about evacuating in the face of bushfire threat. Following the 2009 Victorian
fires, AFAC revised aspects of its official community bushfire safety position to give more
weight to the ‘leave early’ option: “People usually have two safe options when threatened by
bushfire: leaving early or staying and defending adequately prepared properties. Leaving
early is always the safest option” [24, p. 1]. It is probably unwise to assume that householders
residing in wildfire-prone locations will necessarily have a sound understanding of what
leaving “early” means for their particular circumstances, and the planning and preparations
needed to ensure their safety in the face of a wildfire threat. At present, it seems almost
inevitable that for many who do not intend to stay and defend, leaving will follow a period of
waiting and seeing. This needs to be addressed directly by agencies, not simply dismissed as
being a dangerous choice.
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Notes:
1

The official total death toll due to the bushfires is 173: 172 civilians and a firefighter killed

by a falling tree during ongoing containment operations on 17 February [7]. It has been
estimated that during the heatwave in south-eastern Australia 17 January to 8 February 2009
some 374 people died from heat-related causes not associated with bushfires [38].
2

A qualitative analysis of a sample of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 2009

Victorian bushfires task force interview transcripts was reported to the Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission [39]. A preliminary analysis using data from 49 task force interviews with
survivors of the Murrindindi Fire complex was reported previously [32]. While less
comprehensive than the present study, the findings in both the previous reports were
consistent with those reported here. Strawderman et al. [40 ] conducted a telephone survey of
residents affected by the 2007 San Diego wildfires but the focus was on what type of warning
was more likely to result in evacuation. Several studies have been reported which
investigated householders’ reported intentions if threatened by a wildfire [e.g., 16, 41, 42]
3

Information about the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre is available at

www.bushfirecrc.com
4

The fire complexes were: Beechworth-Mudgegonga, Bendigo, Bunyip, Churchill, Horsham,

Kilmore East, Murrindindi, and Narre Warren [7].
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Appendix
Bushfires Research Taskforce Human Behaviour and Community Safety
Interviewer Guidelines
Note: these are a guide only. The participant is likely to answer many of the questions without
being prompted.
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the interview
-Introduce self
-Introduce research
-Provide ethics statement
- Stress independence from agencies and government
- Explain purpose
- Confidentiality
- Contact details
- Further research
- Obtain consent
- If consent is obtained, proceed with the interview
Interview questions and prompts
Starting question
- Tell me what happened to you during the fire
During the discussion prompt for:
Preparation
-How did you prepare? (timeframe)
- How well-prepared did you feel?
-Did you have a plan? If so, what was it?
Information and warnings
-When and how did you first become aware about the fire?
- When did you realise the fire would impact your property?
- Did you receive a warning? Where from? When? How long before the fire? (formal and
informal)
Response
- What did you do (Stay, protect property, shelter in place, wait and see, leave early,
leave late)? Why?
- What did other household members do? Why?
- Who was there? What were they doing?
- Did you get any help? Did you help anyone? Did you see anyone else?
- What did you do after the fire front passed (e.g. stay, return)
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Leaving
- When did you leave?
- Do you think you left early enough?
- Was there a trigger for leaving?
- Where did you go?
- How did you get there?
- When did you return?
Future
- Is there anything you would do differently?
- What could help the wider community respond to bushfires?
Thank participant.
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Table 1
Circumstances associated with 172 civilian fatalities
_________________________________________________
Activity at time of death

%

_________________________________________________
Sheltering inside/near a structure

65

Fleeing: car and/or foot

17

Defending a dwelling

9

Caught in the open on foot

3

Other (e.g., camping, subsequent heart attack)

5

__________________________________________________
Source: Handmer et al [23, p. 33]
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Table 2
Interview Transcript Coding and Rating Categories
__________________________________________________________________________
1. Household composition on the day, and interviewee details.
2. Whereabouts on 7 February 2009, reasons: Chance? Safety?
3. Reported actions if present on the property on the day of the fires: stayed and actively
defended, left before fire impact, sheltered passively.
4. Reported outcomes: house survived, damaged, destroyed; took last-resort shelter, left
safely, left in danger.
5. Stated plans prior to 7 February 2009: ‘stay and defend’, ‘leave’, ‘wait and see’, ‘no
plan’—if no unambiguous statement: ‘unclear plan’.
6. Reported evidence of training, experience with bushfires, reading of agency bushfire
material.
7. Reported insurance coverage.
8. Reported evidence of level of long-term preparation for bushfire:
Extensive (4): vegetation clearing, independent water supply and independent power
source, plus two or more of: sprinklers, implements, water containers, protective
clothing; or detailed evacuation plan including three or more of: safety of documents
and valuables, arrangements for pets/livestock, destination, evacuation routes,
necessities for family needs for 24 hours or more.
Some (3): vegetation clearing, plus up to two or three of the above, in relation to
staying and defending, or to leaving.
Minimal (2): limited vegetation clearing, or discussion of leaving if threatened.
Nil (1).
9. Reported evidence of awareness of fire danger weather on 7 February 2009:
High (4): Frequent acts of vigilance during the day including monitoring the local
radio, checking agency web sites, scanning the environment for smoke or embers,
telephoning friends or family.
Some (3): Infrequent checks of two or more of the above.
Minimal (2): Radio on, or occasional glance at the environment.
Nil (1).
10. Reported evidence of physical readiness for a bushfire on 7 February 2009:
High (4): equipment ready and tested, water containers filled, protective clothing
ready; or bags packed and ready, pets/livestock readied, vehicle(s) fuelled and ready.
Some (3): some evidence of special preparation to defend or to leave: one or two of
the above.
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Minimal (2): clearing of leaf litter and similar; or discussion of leaving if a fire was
reported.
Nil (1).

11. Reported evidence of knowledge of bushfires:
High (4): Two or more of training, reading, practice, experience.
Some (3): Attended CFA meeting(s) or reading.
Minimal (2): General knowledge from the media.
Nil (1).
12. Reported evidence of level of awareness of approaching fire:
High (4): Early awareness of a fire, active attempts to track location.
Some (3): Awareness of fire somewhere in the area.
Minimal (2): Only aware when threat obvious.
Nil (1): Taken by surprise.
13. Readiness to act if fire threatened
High (4): Acknowledged threat, anticipated impact; immediate action
Some (3): Aware of threat, some concern, some uncertainty about action
Minimal (2): Aware of a fire, threat not personalized, uncertainty/hesitation
Nil (1): Surprised: inaction or ‘panic’ reaction
14. Expected an official warning of bushfire threat to community?
15. Report of potential influence(s) on decision making (Table 6).
16. Other key issues or events potentially related to outcome (Table 4).
17. Evidence of: attachment to property, links to community.
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3
Householders’ bushfire survival plans and actions (N = 457)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Plan

Action
_________________________________________________________________________________
Left previous

Defended

Defended

Sheltered

Left

Left

day

successfully

failed

passively

safely

danger

% (n)

% (n)

% (n)

% (n)

% (n)

% (n) %

Total

(n)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Stay and defend

<1 (1)

31 (143)

8 (38)

<1 (2)

6 (29)

4 (16)

Leave safely

2 (8)

2 (9)

<1 (1)

<1 (1)

13 (59)

5 (25)

Wait and see

<1 (1)

<1 (2)

<1 (1)

0 (0)

3 (15)

2 (7)

6 (26)
13 (61)

No plan

0 (0)

3 (14)

2 (7)

1 (3)

5 (23)

3 (14)

Unclear plan

0 (0)

2 (8)

<1 (2)

<1 (2)

3 (12)

4 (16)

Total

2 (10)

10 (47)

2 (8)

39 (176)

30 (138)

50 (229)
23 (103)

8 (38)

17 (78) 100 (457)

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4
Potential safety-compromising issues described by more than five percent of householders present on the day and
differences between those who stayed and defended and those who left (N = 439)
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Safety-compromising

Percentage reportinga

Total number

χ2 (df = 1) pb,c

Cramer’s

reporting (%)a

issue

V

_________________
Stayed and

Left

defended
(n = 223)

(n = 216)

_______________________________________________________________________________________
Lack of time to prepare

37%

32%

152

(37%)

Equipment failured

48%

17%

145

(33%)

47.19 <.001

.33

Lack of official information

18%

33%

111

(25%)

13.75 <.001

.18

Panic, fear, or anxiety

18%

19%

80

(18%)

<.01

.01

Lack of watere

23%

5%

62

(14%)

27.14 <.001

Fire more intense than expected

57%

43%

56

(13%)

House vulnerabilityf

18%

7%

55

(13%)

11.12 .001

.17

Householder injury/fatigue

17%

4%

46

(10%)

16.76 <.001

.20

Responsibility for dependents

10%

7%

37

(8%)

0.86

.35 ns

.05

4%

7%

25

(6%)

1.74 .19 ns

.07

Evacuation route blocked

1.13 .25 ns

.97 ns

0.76 .38 ns

______________________________________________________________________________________
a

Several householders reported more than one issue so the percentages sum to more than 100%.

b

Bonferroni critical p value = .05/10 = .005

c

ns = not significant

d

Most failures were associated with water supply: power, pumps; plastic pipes, fittings, water tanks.

e

Mostly, this involved low levels of stored water due to the drought conditions.

f

These included adjacent fuels, ground slope, and structure vulnerability to ember attack, often in combinations.

.01

.26
.05
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Table 5
Comparison of bushfire readiness indicator ratings for those who stayed and defended with those who left
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Action
Readiness Rating Level (%)
n
χ2 (df = 3)
pbc
Cramer’s V
Readiness Indicatora
_____________________________
Nil
Minimal Some
High
Long-term preparation (.94)
Defended
4
16
32
48
213
Left
19
38
35
8
189
94.12
<.001
.48
Knowledge of bushfire (.89)
Defended
4
15
53
28
171
Left
23
34
29
14
122
49.79
<.001
.41
Preparation on the day (.95)
Defended
8
17
37
38
220
Left
29
26
34
11
204
58.37
<.001
.37
Awareness of fire danger
Defended
8
8
25
59
166
Weather (.88)
Left
15
17
26
42
158
11.53
009 ns
.19
Awareness of approaching
Defended
3
22
55
20
221
Fire (.92)
Left
6
25
60
9
214
11.14
.011 ns
.16
Readiness to take
Defended
17
28
30
25
214
survival action (.83)
Left
10
29
29
32
210
5.40
.145 ns
.15
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a
Figures in brackets are inter-rater reliability indices as Cohen’s Kappa
b
Bonferroni critical p value is .05/6 = .008
c
ns = not significant
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Table 6
Percentage of each group of survivors reporting a specific decision influence, Chi-square tests, and transcript examples
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Decision influencea Percentage reporting decision
χ2 (1,
pbc
Cramer’s
Examplesd
influence
N=439)
V
Stayed to defend
Left
n=223
n=216
Self-efficacy (.85)

40%

3%

84.89

< .001

.44

Stayed: ...when I saw the fire coming, and it was just a grass
fire, I said ‘well, we can handle that.’ (#060)
Left: ...And I was quite confident what I was doing, but it was
difficult to see. I mean, I could have run off the road but I knew
the main fire had gone through. (#158)

Environmental
trigger (.94)

25%

63%

63.99

< .001

.38

Stayed: ...we saw the smoke. We knew it was time to make a
decision and I decided I’d stay and see if I could control any
embers coming on to our property. (#076)
Left: And I looked up...and saw a huge glow in the sky...and I
said ‘that’s not smoke, that’s fire’. And we said ‘right, we’re
leaving’. That was our decision. (#068)

Commitment to
plan (.91)

78%

41%

61.90

< .001

.38

Stayed: We’d always said, the three of us, that if there was a
fire we would defend. Simple as that. (#102)
Left: It just hadn’t been practical to spend the time and money
in setting ourselves up in order to stay. So we knew that if there
was any threat of fire we wouldn’t stay, under no
circumstances. (#064)

Outcome efficacy
(.83)

30%

3%

58.84

< .001

.37

Stayed: ...as far as preparation and everything else, no I

don’t think there is anything more we could have done.
We were as prepared as we could be. (# 044)
Left: I said to the kids ‘Follow me straight to the Recreation
Centre in Flowerdale’. Which I thought was the safest place,
which as it turned out, it was. (#307)

Family safety

9%

27%

25.02

< .001

.24

Stayed: As for leaving the house, I knew J____ and the boys
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concerns (.88)

were going to be here (defending) and I couldn’t have gone off
and left them. (#106)
Left: In my mind always I’ve said to M____ if there’s any sort
of threat I don’t care about the house. I’d just rather be with
the kids and be safe. (#061)

Perceived threat
from fire (.91)

31%

48%

13.64

< .001

.18

Stayed: Somebody said to me ‘why didn’t you get in the cars
and leave?’ because we had them sitting there. I said I couldn’t
have driven them out through that fire for anything. (#067)
Left: Then a massive roar came and the flames came over the
ridge...it was incredibly frightening. I said ‘we need to go, go
now’. (#065)

Warnings from
neighbours, family
(.96)

37%

63%

8.80

.003

.14

Stayed: The neighbours came from next door and told us there
was a fire, so we got ready. (#167)
Left: ...and my friend rang me back and said you should
probably think about going now, so he was obviously a lot
more aware of what was going on than we were. (#105)

Lack of warning, no
alternative (.83)

26%

19%

3.55

.060 ns

. 09

Stayed: We saw (the fire) jump there and we thought, no we
can’t go now. So we were going to stay, we weren’t going to
go. (#060)
Left: I went inside and grabbed my car keys, and it’s lucky I
had my keys inside because if I’d stayed outside I wouldn’t
have made it to my car. (#144)

Concern for
pets/livestock (.98)

16%

22%

3.05

.081 ns

.08

Stayed: Then it got to the stage where I had to go to rescue the
horse here. So I got the horse out and got back to the house.
(#097)
Left: One of the things that prompted me to to leave early was
with five dogs I didn’t like my chances in a panic of getting
(them) into car to get out of here. (#064)

Insurance coverage
(1.00)

1%

3%

2.17

.141 ns

.07

Stayed: That’s the other thing. That’s another reason why I
had to fight for it (--the house-). I’m not that rich, I can’t
afford insurance. (#257)
Left: [Interviewer] – Now why did you make the decision to
leave rather than stay? [Householder]—Because our house is
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insured. (#105)
Perceived fire threat
greater than
expected (.88)

14%

Local radio
warnings/news (.92)

57%

11%

1.03

.310 ns

.05

Stayed: ...get a bucket ready for after, to put the fires out,

and I did all that. But the fire was so aggressive, all of a
sudden all the windows exploded in my house and black
smoke came in and I couldn't breathe anymore, so I had
to go outside. (# 042)
Left: I was at home and I thought, oh yeah, the bushfire’s
coming so no problems. So I got everything set up for a
small bushfire. Once it came over that hill, mate, I’m out
of there. So I ran. (#11)
43%

0.12

.740 ns

.02

Stayed: On the Saturday we were just keeping an eye on things
and listening to the radio news about where the fire was going,
and watching the smoke. (#102)
Left: So we listened to the (local) radio and about half an hour
after, it came on the radio that there was a large fire at
Churchill...so probably about 2pm we made a decision to leave.
(#164)

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a

Figures in brackets are inter-rater reliability indices as Cohen’s Kappa; householders could report more than one decision influence
Bonferroni critical p value = .05/12 = .004
c
ns = not significant
d
Number in brackets is the interview transcript number
b

